In 2009, Marc Andreessen—a Silicon Valley entrepreneur and angel investor easiest identified for cofounding Netscape, in 1994, at the age of twenty-two—announced that he can be starting a project-capital firm. “I’m crossing over into the dark aspect,” he said, jokingly, to the PBS talk-present host Charlie Rose. Andreessen explained that he can be starting the firm with a longtime colleague, Ben Horowitz, and that Andreessen Horowitz can be “by entrepreneurs, for entrepreneurs.” Over the next decade, the firm would lend a hand fund Facebook, Skype, Lyft, Pinterest, Airbnb, Slack, Stripe, and Coinbase. Its assets can be price extra than sixteen billion dollars, and it’d be regarded as probably the most premier V.C. corporations in Silicon Valley.
The firm, modelled after Michael Ovitz’s Creative Artists Agency, had a original approach to project capital. Partners at Andreessen Horowitz, all of whom had been regarded as area specialists, supported entrepreneurs as if they had been Hollywood talent, pitching in with research and recruiting. The company also had a original angle on the media. Andreessen had been booked on “Charlie Rose” thanks to Margit Wennmachers, the co-founder of an influential Silicon Valley P.R. shop called OutCast; Wennmachers quickly joined Andreessen Horowitz as a partner. At the time, most startups saw marketing and publicity as an afterthought. Similarly, at most media retailers, tech coverage tended toward dry industry reporting, product-release announcements, and opinions of original gadgets. Nonetheless Wennmachers made P.R. a priority for Andreessen Horowitz and the companies it funded. At her brightly decorated home, she hosted unusual, off-the-document parties all via which tech journalists may mingle with startup executives and founders over food and cocktails. Where project capitalists had traditionally avoided publicity, Wennmachers encouraged Andreessen and Horowitz to ask media attention.
As user applied sciences evolved, so did tech coverage. Within the aughts, a slate of tech-focussed blogs sprang up, and the readership for tech coverage expanded. In a thought called “Toward a Optimistic Abilities Criticism,” revealed in 2016 by the Columbia Journalism Review, the author and critic Sara M. Watson identified the release of the iPhone, in 2007, as a turning level in the way journalists talked about tech. As smartphones reached market saturation in the United States, tech coverage became increasingly entangled with culture, economics, politics, labor, and media. Ordinary individuals “had been now a petite nearer to technology” in their daily lives, Watson wrote, and “leading technology commentators celebrated tech’s “potential for advancing democracy and empowering individuals.” As technology became extra accessible, diffuse, and pervasive, technological optimism itself—TED Talks, conception leadership—became a product.
In 2011, Andreessen revealed an essay in the Wall Road Journal titled “Why Software Is Eating the World.” “My dangle idea is that we are at some stage in a dramatic and broad technological and financial shift whereby software companies are poised to take over large swathes of the economy,” he wrote. “In some industries, particularly those with a heavy real-world component such as oil and gas, the software revolution is primarily an alternative for incumbents. Nonetheless in many industries, original software ideas will lead to the upward thrust of original Silicon Valley-fashion start-u.s.a.that invade existing industries with impunity.” Andreessen predicted that the decade to near back would learn about “story” battles between “incumbents and software-powered insurgents.” The op-ed, which was both a prognostication and an funding thesis, was widely read and bolstered Andreessen’s reputation as one of Silicon Valley’s intellectuals—no longer merely a middleman nonetheless a man of ideas. Among other issues, this reputation was worthwhile for “deal circulation”: it made Andreessen extra attractive to both startup founders and investors.
In May, 2012, Forbes dubbed Andreessen and Horowitz “Challenge Capital’s Unusual Bad Boys.” That same month, Andreessen graced the quilt of Wired, below the headline “The Man Who Makes the Future.” Meanwhile, other V.C. corporations had been hiring their very dangle communications and marketing teams. Later that year, an article in the Instances—“Challenge Capital Companies, Once Discreet, Learn the Promotional Game”—regarded as the pattern in the context of a consolidating, hypercompetitive project trade. There have been fewer active project corporations than all via the dot-com bubble, and over-all returns had been low. Institutional investors wanted to work with easiest the tip corporations, and project capitalists had to sell themselves to entrepreneurs, rather than the opposite way around. Restful, the article’s author, Nicole Perlroth, wrote, “the greatest catalyst for the attention-searching for atmosphere, project capitalists say, has been the upward thrust of Andreessen Horowitz.”
If the tech trade was promoting itself, journalists on the tech beat had been among its enthusiastic investors. Tech coverage tended to be written from the angle of the user; this worked for gadget opinions nonetheless was inadequate for contextualizing the ambitions of companies appreciate Lyft and Airbnb. In a 2020 paper, “Phrases Matter: How Tech Media Helped Write Gig Companies Into Existence,” the San Francisco-based reporter Sam Harnett worthy that tech coverage in the twenty-tens was characterized partly by the unquestioning adoption of trade rhetoric to describe companies offering on-demand providers and transportation. Acquiescing to the terms station by the trade, Harnett argued—“disruption,” “sharing economy,” “platform,” “innovation,” even “startup”—also helped “pave the way for a handful of companies that explain a little fraction of the economy to have an outsized impact on law, mainstream corporate practices, and the way we gain about work.” By aligning with consumers, rather than software engineers or gig workers, the coverage also elided the examine of whether or no longer companies appreciate TaskRabbit and Uber had been ultimately in the industry of technology as such.
Within the media and the imagination, certain narratives became pervasive. Silicon Valley was the epicenter of innovation, home to stewards of the longer term. Tech entrepreneurs had been iconoclastic younger underdogs motivated by personal hardships, social consciousness, and sheer ingenuity. Startups weren’t good businesses nonetheless mission-driven organizations that may upend the status quo, join and liberate humanity, and change the realm for the upper. An earlier Silicon Valley mythology of post-counterculture nerds in electronics-cluttered garages grew sleeker, slimmer, and better capitalized. The scrappy, Steve Jobs-appreciate obsessive with a taste for prime obtain was repackaged for post-recession millennials. Claims of “democratization” abounded. Mark Zuckerberg became an archetype. Workplace perks and relaxed corporate mores had been treated as metonyms for ethics and ideals. Despite a rising physique of criticism from academics and writers at Valleywag, the Baffler, Dissent, the Awl, and in utterly different places, tales of benevolent disruption had been reproduced and reified. Software was eating the realm, and the realm was going to appreciate it.
Silicon Valley is a future-oriented place. Of their early phases, startups normally look implausible (home rentals), minor (online payments), frivolous (social media), or volatile (crawl-hailing). A well-crafted narrative about innovative underdogs and counterintuitive nonetheless inevitable success was legitimizing. The role played by project capital itself rarely figured: widespread adoption was seen as a reflection of advantage, rather than a characteristic of a funding model that ragged cash reserves to create original monopolies. By the mid-twenty-tens, Andreessen Horowitz’s marketing strategy had evolved into something appreciate mythology. As late as 2014, Wired was level-headed referring to Andreessen, then forty-two years mature, as a “wunderkind.”
The Edward Snowden revelations, in 2013, increased awareness of the social and political implications of user applied sciences. Nonetheless John Carreyrou’s reporting on the blood-diagnostics company Theranos, revealed in the Wall Road Journal starting in 2015, was an even extra affirm hit to Silicon Valley mythologizing. Elizabeth Holmes, the company’s founder, dressed appreciate and had been hailed as “the next Steve Jobs”; a younger Stanford dropout, she had appeared on the quilt of T Magazine for a fable written by Laura Arrillaga-Andreessen, Marc Andreessen’s partner. Theranos was the beneficiary of a total bunch of hundreds of thousands of dollars in project funding and an abundance of ravishing tech coverage. In a profile revealed in The Unusual Yorker in 2014, Holmes equipped an explanation of Theranos’s technology: “A chemistry is carried out so that a chemical reaction happens and generates a signal from the chemical interaction with the sample, which is translated into a result, which is then reviewed by licensed laboratory personnel,” she said. Carreyrou realized that, in fact, the proprietary blood-attempting out machines that Theranos claimed to have constructed had been a farce; the company was utilizing traditional medical devices and was a fraud.
Then came the 2016 Presidential election, whereby an outlier candidate, mirroring the rhetorical habits of ironic and inflammatory message-board culture, leveraged social media and targeted advertising to spread misinformation and galvanize his base. The news media began to indicate a diminished appetite for triumphalist storytelling about tech. Unusual terms, such as “surveillance capitalism,” filtered into the conversation, along with worthwhile concepts (online radicalization) and suggestive shorthand (“the algorithm”). There have been level-headed column inches for tales of younger upstarts, nonetheless they had been decreased to make room for reporting on fraud, exploitation, privacy violations, security breaches, polarization, disagreement, and discrimination. Many of the original tales relied on worker and worker accounts. In her article for CJR, Watson had identified some tics of tech writing: moral panic, technological determinism, the pathologizing of user behavior, and the appeal to readerly anxiety. The original wave of tech criticism exhibited these trends, too. To a couple, the media’s intensified scrutiny was well deserved and past due; to others, even investigative reporting appeared appreciate personally motivated backlash.
Toward the stay of the twenty-tens, it became unclear whether or no longer the realm had been eaten by software or impartial paved over. Many of Silicon Valley’s most extremely valued companies had been platforms that aggregated transactions. Regularly, this meant that they’d constructed private, high-margin layers atop real-world processes while externalizing the risks. In 2018, a flattering profile of Wennmachers, revealed in Wired, suggested that she faced a “original and critical challenge: crafting a revamped image of the techie of the longer term, one that embraces the great responsibility that arrives with newfound great energy.” The delusion had been distorted; the idealistic, aspirational narratives had no longer borne out. The trade wished a original fable.
What may perhaps a original narrative for the tech trade look appreciate? In April of last year, as COVID-19 cases spiked across the country, Andreessen revealed a weblog post to his firm’s Net region, titled “IT’S TIME TO BUILD.” “Each Western institution was unprepared for the coronavirus pandemic, regardless of many prior warnings,” Andreessen wrote. He went on to argue that certain shameful facts about the response to the coronavirus—shortages of swabs, reagents, gowns, and surgical masks; the absence of a vaccine or treatment; insufficient and inaccessible bailout funds—weren’t good failures of action and imagination nonetheless evidence of regulatory capture, “inertia,” and a “widespread inability to bag.” The penalties of this inability may be seen in utterly different places—in housing vogue, education, manufacturing, and transportation. “You don’t good learn about this smug complacency, this satisfaction with the status quo and the unwillingness to bag, in the pandemic, or in healthcare generally,” he wrote. “You learn about it all via Western lifestyles, and specifically all via American lifestyles.” For many readers, the essay was a sequel to “Why Software Is Eating the World”: both a diagnosis and a mission statement.
Among Andreessen’s dangle suggestions for what to bag had been scalable universities, digital tutoring platforms, and automated domestic factories. “Why aren’t we constructing Elon Musk’s ‘alien dreadnoughts’—giant, gleaming, state of the art factories producing each conceivable form of product, at probably the most fascinating that you can imagine quality and lowest that you can imagine value—all all via our country?” he asked. (On a 2016 earnings call, Musk had advised analysts that “alien dreadnought” was his imaginative and prescient for the next Gigafactory, a high-pace, automated facility for manufacturing the Mannequin 3.) “Where are the supersonic aircraft? Where are the hundreds of thousands of offer drones? Where are the high pace trains, the soaring monorails, the hyperloops, and yes, the flying cars?”
A strain of wishful, ahistorical pondering pervaded the essay, which ran beneath a inventory image of a futuristic, fictional metropolis with gleaming skyscrapers, a blue, unpolluted sky, and no individuals. Andreessen passed over the role the tech trade had played in accelerating the erosion of some American institutions; his insistence that constructing must be separated from politics was strange, given that America’s failures in the face of the coronavirus didn’t happen in the absence of political will. Nonetheless “IT’S TIME TO BUILD” also articulated certain undeniable realities. The housing disaster in the Bay Area is as Andreessen described—a nightmare, created by archaic zoning ordinances, NIMBYism, an irresponsible tax gadget, and political gridlock, which has compelled many longtime renters out, and makes it “nearly no longer seemingly for regular individuals to scamper in and take the jobs of the longer term,” or any job. Andreessen was lawful, too, to criticize the federal authorities for distributing aid funds via paper assessments, rather than a digital gadget. At the heart of Andreessen’s essay was an uncontroversial reality: from housing and education to mass transportation, individuals deserved better. (“Is the situation money?” Andreessen asked. “That appears hard to imagine after we have the cash to wage never-ending wars in the Middle East and repeatedly bail out incumbent banks, airlines, and carmakers.”)
“IT’S TIME TO BUILD” went viral in tech circles, spawning a small and sturdy corpus of launch letters, Substack dispatches, Hacker Information comments, Reddit threads, and tweets. Some readers heralded it as an “instant classic,” “era-defining,” and “a potent call to arms.” Others expressed skepticism and disgust, or revealed granular rebuttals. Responses spanned the ideological spectrum. Colin McAuliffe and Jason Ganz, at the modern gain tank Data for Growth, suggested constructing by enabling extra public research and vogue. Scott Berkun, a author and early Microsoft worker, wrote a weblog post proposing free Information superhighway for all, universal basic health care, and a stronger social safety get. In Exponents, an online magazine dedicated to neoliberal conception, Steven Buss, a software engineer and YIMBY (“Yes in My Backyard”) activist, argued for an stay to occupational licensing and commercial land-spend restrictions, subsidies for vocational-training programs, and a revamp of the F.D.A., so that it is “permissive by default.” On a panel about the essay, hosted by the Lincoln Community, a libertarian nonprofit that aims to join Silicon Valley technologists and D.C. policymakers, Mark Lutter, the director of the Charter Cities Institute, said that constructing can be extra seemingly to happen if “policy entrepreneurs” had been held in the same high regard as startup founders. “If we gain about the success of what may be called the builder circulate, that appears to be like appreciate two or three individuals from Silicon Valley getting Cabinet or Cabinet-level positions,” Lutter said. “Why isn’t Marc Andreessen Secretary of Commerce or something?”